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IMPROVING THE EVALUATION PROCESS FOR ACTIVE SAFETY 
FUNCTIONS  
Addressing Key Challenges in Functional, Formative Evaluation of Advanced Driver 
Assistance Systems  
 
MIKAEL LJUNG AUST 
Department of Applied Mechanics 
Chalmers University of Technology 
 
ABSTRACT 
The general aim of the present thesis was to improve key steps in the procedure for 
functional, formative evaluation of Advanced Driver Assistance Systems (ADAS). Five 
unresolved theoretical and empirical issues were identified and addressed. The first 
identified issue was the lack of a general conceptual framework for ADAS evaluation 
that can help formulate functional specifications and generate testable hypotheses on 
ADAS influence in critical driving scenarios. In response, a conceptual framework 
called Situational Control was developed. The second issue concerned the current ways 
in which crash data is used to specify ADAS evaluation scenarios. An improved 
methodology for linking a set of in-depth investigated case studies to a general crash 
type was developed and successfully tested. The third issue concerned the extent to 
which data from in-depth investigations of fatal crashes can be used to specify ADAS 
evaluation scenarios. Some countries have fully representative in-depth investigated 
datasets for this crash type, but their relevance for ADAS evaluation has not been 
investigated. An empirical study of causation information in fatal intersection crashes 
was performed. However, the information collected in these investigations was found 
to be limited in ways which made them less useful for defining ADAS evaluation 
scenarios.  The fourth issue was whether sufficiently critical driving events that result in 
realistic driver responses can be created and repeated in driving simulator based ADAS 
evaluation. A study was performed in which two groups of drivers, one with and one 
without FCW, were exposed to repeated critical lead vehicle braking events. Results 
indicate that while creating a single surprise event is possible, interaction effects that 
compromise result generalizability occur when the critical event is repeated. The fifth 
issue concerned principles for how to assess the combined influence multiple ADAS 
when present in the same vehicle. A study of an FOT evaluated ADAS bundle 
consisting of FCW and ACC was carried out to empirically test whether existing 
conceptual models for calculating the combined effect of multiple safety functions were 
applicable. The results indicate that existing models were too simplistic to account for 
the complex modifications of driver behavior found in the data. 
 
 
Keywords: Advanced Driver Assistance Systems, Active Safety Systems, Safety 
Benefit Assessment, Driver Behavior Analysis, Crash Causation Analysis, 
Situational Control, In-depth Crash Investigation 
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1  Introduction 
 
Traffic safety has long been, and continues to be, an important issue to address. For 
example, in 2006, there were 1.3 million road accidents involving personal injury in the 
EU-27, and 42 950 persons lost their lives (Eurostat, 2009).  
 
Over time, numerous routes toward crash prevention have been invented and tried out. 
These include improved road design (e.g. clear zones), public awareness campaigns 
(e.g. don’t drink and drive) and deployment of in-vehicle systems that protect drivers 
from injury when a crash is inevitable (seat belts, air bags, rollover protection systems, 
etc.).  
 
A relatively novel approach towards accident prevention and injury reduction is the 
introduction of vehicle based active safety functions, also known as Advanced Driver 
Assistance Systems or ADAS. In contrast to protective, or passive, in-vehicle safety 
functions whose purpose is to mitigate crash consequences, the general goal of ADAS is 
to prevent crashes from occurring at all. ADAS are meant to achieve their preventive 
effect either by alerting the driver to potential hazards and/or by taking over the driving 
task to some extent, using e.g. autonomous braking in emergency situations.  
 
An ADAS typically consist of one or more environment sensors mounted on the 
vehicle, e.g. radars and/or cameras, a software that based on the sensor input 
determines what actions the ADAS should take, and a driver and/or vehicle interface 
that can be used to alert the driver and/or control the vehicle. Examples of safety 
technologies which fall under the ADAS umbrella are FCW, ACC, LDW, and 
Drowsiness Warning. Several ADAS, including those mentioned, have recently been 
deployed on the market, and more are close to introduction. 
 
A key issue for ADAS, like for all other means of crash and injury prevention, is to verify 
that they are beneficial, i.e. that they actually improve traffic safety. While the safety 
potential of ADAS can be affected by many factors, Carsten and Nilsson (2001) 
proposed that all safety implications can be classified as belonging to either of three 
general aspects: the function safety aspect (technical reliability of the system), the 
Human Machine Interaction aspect (operating, and communicating with, the system), 
and the traffic safety aspect (system influence on driving behavior, including changes in 
interactions with other road users). For a complete ADAS evaluation, verification must 
take place at all three levels.  
 
All three aspects present interesting study topics. In the present work however, the 
scope is limited to the traffic safety aspect only. Sensor and algorithm verification, as 
well as interaction design issues, are left aside. Instead, the focus is on improving 
available procedures for assessing to what extent an ADAS influences driver behavior in 
relevant, often critical, driving situations, where the goal is to be able to robustly 
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identify any ADAS driven driver behavior changes that may influence traffic safety in a 
positive or negative way. 
 
1.1 Formalizing the formative ADAS evaluation procedure 
Assessing an ADAS influence on driver behavior in particular or general traffic 
situations and deducing safety implications of potential behavioral changes is often 
referred to as functional ADAS evaluation. Functional evaluation can take place either 
prior to, or some time after, a function has been released into production vehicles. This 
is referred to as formative and summative evaluation respectively, a terminology coined 
by Scriven (1967). In the present context, formative evaluation thus relates primarily to 
laboratory based evaluation of an ADAS during its development stage, while summative 
evaluation refers to an evaluation of the function’s performance in the real world after 
mass deployment in the vehicle fleet has started.  
 
In terms of summative ADAS evaluation, there is unfortunately still a lack of relevant 
data. Since these functions only recently have reached the market, and because ADAS 
tend to be sold as options rather than standard features even on premium cars, it is yet 
too early to identify a sufficiently large ADAS equipped vehicle population in publicly 
available crash databases that can be compared to a similar, non ADAS equipped, fleet. 
This sets a further delimitation for the present work, i.e. this thesis discusses only 
formative ADAS evaluation, not summative evaluation.  
 
The fact that for any new ADAS it will always take quite some time (often years) before 
sufficiently many people have bought and used the system to allow for summative 
evaluation has generated a lot of interest in the research community in terms of 
formative evaluation. Many wish to see these new and promising technologies widely 
deployed, but also recognize the need to try to make sure that one is not deploying 
something potentially harmful, i.e. that turns out to have a negative impact on traffic 
safety. Thus, even if the exact traffic safety impact of an ADAS only might be possible to 
assess in retrospect (Carsten and Nilsson, 2001), numerous large scale projects, both in 
Europe and the US, have tried to come up with evaluation procedures that will allow for 
reasonably robust prediction of which benefit(s) any given ADAS may add or subtract 
from the traffic system.  
 
In the US, one of the earliest efforts was the CAMP project (Deering 2004; Shulman 
and Deering 2004; Shulman and Deering 2005), initiated by Ford and General Motors 
in 1995 to accelerate implementation of crash avoidance countermeasures in passenger 
vehicles. CAMP consisted of many sub-projects, but of particular relevance here is the 
FCW alert timing project (Kiefer et al. 2003; Kiefer et al. 2005). Other projects include 
several FOTs, such as RDCW (LeBlanc et al. 2006a), IVBSS (Sayer et al. 2011), and 
ACAS (Najm et al. 2006). Other approaches include Gordon et al. (2010), who 
developed a simulation based approach to ADAS evaluation, and CICAS (Maile et al. 
2008) where a scenario based evaluation approach for collision avoidance systems in 
intersections was devised. 
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In Europe, projects aimed towards various aspects of formative ADAS evaluation 
procedures include HASTE (Carsten et al. 2005), AIDE (Kussmann et al. 2005), 
ASSESS (Dobberstein et al. 2010), INTERACTIVE (Bakri et al. 2011) APROSYS 
(Eggers and De Lange 2007), TRACE (Karabatsou et al. 2006), PReVAL (Scholliers et 
al. 2008b), SeMiFOT (SeMiFOT, 2009), eIMPACT (Assing et al. 2006), RESPONSE 
3 (Knapp and Schwarz 2006), CONVERGE (Maltby et al. 1998; Zhang et al. 1998), 
and SafeTE (Engström and Mårdh 2007). 
 
There has also been several attempts at standardization of ADAS evaluation procedures 
in Europe and the US, including The European Statement of Principles (Commission 
2008), the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers’ guidelines (2003) and the checklist 
by Stevens et al. (1999).  
 
There are many ways to describe formative ADAS evaluation, but a common approach 
in many of the above projects is to create a formalized flowchart that details the 
required steps of formative ADAS evaluation. Examples include CONVERGE (Maltby 
et al. 1998; Zhang et al. 1998), APROSYS (Eggers and De Lange 2007), eIMPACT 
(Assing et al. 2006), AIDE (Janssen et al. 2008), ACAT (Carter et al. 2009), and 
PReVAL (Scholliers et al. 2008b). Of these, one that integrated previous approaches, 
and which later projects often refer to, is the flowchart from PReVAL. PReVAL was a 
subproject of PReVENT, a large EC- funded effort to bring various ADAS under 
development closer to market release. The goal of PReVAL was to provide a 
harmonized evaluation and impact assessment methodology for the ADAS developed 
in PReVENT, and apply the methodology to a set of given use cases. 
 
The PReVAL flowchart is based on CONVERGE (Maltby et al. 1998; Zhang et al. 
1998) and the experiences of APROSYS (Eggers and De Lange 2007) and AIDE 
(Janssen et al. 2008). It is organized similarly to the three aspects identified by Carsten 
and Nilsson (2001), i.e. there is technical evaluation, human factors evaluation and 
impact assessment, though the human factors evaluation is more focused on functional 
assessment than interaction design. Technical evaluation is performed in two phases: 
firstly the verification to test the individual components and subsystems towards the 
technical specifications, and secondly the validation to test whether the goals and 
specifications of the complete system are met. Human factors evaluation assesses the 
extent to which the ADAS succeeds in generating the intended behavioral responses 
from the driver in the relevant critical situations. Impact assessment aims to make an 
aggregate-level assessment of the ADAS effects on relevant harm metrics, usually the 
number of fatalities, in target situations, based on the technical performance and 
behavioral impact of the ADAS (Scholliers et al. 2007a). The flowchart is based on the 
so called V design cycle (Scholliers et al. 2008a), commonly used in the automotive 
industry, and which here is extended by including the different steps of the evaluation 
process, see Figure!1.   
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Figure 1. The PReVAL ADAS Evaluation Flowchart 
 
The PReVAL flowchart for ADAS evaluation specifies six steps which are common for 
both the technical and human factors evaluation (Scholliers et al. 2007b): 
 
1. Functional specification: At the start of an evaluation, a sufficiently detailed 
functional description needs to be available, that is common for all assessments and 
consistent with functional specifications for other ADAS under evaluation.  
 
2. Expected impact: Describing the objectives of the ADAS in such a way that it is 
possible to evaluate its performance, i.e. generate hypotheses on how the ADAS is 
expected to change driver behavior in relevant critical situations.  
 
3. Scenario definition: To test the generated hypotheses, test scenarios need to be 
defined.  
 
4. Method selection: Selection of the method(s) through which the test scenarios 
should be run, typically test track, driving simulator, or field study.  
 
5. Test plan: Specifies the number of tests, independent and dependent variables, and 
actual measurements. It also describes which experimental design to use including the 
number of subjects, and covers all other details required to acquire statistically 
significant results in the hypotheses testing. 
 
6. Test execution, analysis, and reporting: Conducting tests, analyzing results, and 
drawing conclusions. 
 
While this flowchart gives a well structured overview of the steps of an evaluation 
procedure, ADAS evaluation can still be said to suffer from intrinsic difficulties and a 
!5 
lack of harmonization (Scholliers et al. 2007a). To understand this statement, it is 
helpful to compare with the evaluation of in-vehicle injury protection systems like 
airbags and seatbelts. In this domain, the procedure which has emerged as the gold 
standard for testing of new functions is called a load case. The term load is to be taken 
very literally, i.e. a load case describes a specific test condition where vehicle and 
driver/passenger surrogates, i.e. crash test dummies, are exposed to a specific physical 
loading, through e.g. crashing the vehicle head on into a barrier or rolling it over. 
Measurements of how the physical loading effects the dummies and the vehicle are then 
used to predict the real world performance of vehicles built to the tested specification in 
certain crash types (Korner 1989).   
 
The development and validation of load case procedures for evaluating in-vehicle injury 
protection systems has been ongoing for quite some time, and the test specifications in 
use today are both standardized and specified at a high level of detail regarding scenario 
definition, performance metrics, and pass/fail criteria, see e.g. EuroNCAP (2004; 2008; 
2009). Furthermore, the laboratory processes for doing full scale and component crash 
testing have iteratively been refined to the point where they actually can be certified as 
accredited laboratories, fulfilling standards such as AIC (2010). 
 
ADAS evaluation procedures have yet to reach this level of detail and sophistication. 
The projects mentioned above have all helped improve on the details of an ADAS 
evaluation process, but there is still no general agreement, let alone standardization, on 
what the evaluation procedure should look like other than on a quite abstract level such 
as the PReVAL flowchart.  
1.2 General goal and structure of the thesis 
The present thesis is mainly a methodology thesis, focused on issues related to ADAS 
evaluation. The general goal is to improve the general process for functional, formative 
evaluation of ADAS. The six steps of the PReVAL procedure provide a general 
guideline for the work., i.e. the general idea is to achieve the goal by addressing a subset 
of the intrinsic difficulties associated with implementing each of the six steps in the 
PReVAL evaluation procedure.  
 
The thesis includes both theoretical as well as empirical work. The theoretical work 
addresses an unresolved issue in step 1 and 2, i.e. functional specification and expected 
impact. It can be argued that a prerequisite for formulating relevant functional 
descriptions as well as hypothesis on ADAS effects is a conceptual framework that 
describes the role of the driver and the role of the ADAS in the context of resolving 
critical driving situations. For reasons to be further reviewed below, such a framework is 
yet to be clearly formulated. In Section 2, criteria for, and required components of, such 
a framework are set up, and possible component contenders are reviewed in light of 
ADAS evaluation. In Paper I, a framework called Situational Control is formulated that 
meet the defined criteria.   
The empirical work address four unresolved issues in steps 3-6. Step 3, scenario 
definition, is about defining relevant test scenarios for the ADAS evaluation. A data 
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source commonly used in such work is real world crash data, since it provides a real 
world foundation for the test scenarios. However, for scenario descriptions to be both 
representative and sufficiently detailed in terms of characterizing the crash causation 
mechanisms an ADAS needs to neutralize to be effective, the extraction process has to 
solve either the generalization or the case selection problem.  
 
The generalization problem is the question of how to determine whether findings from 
a particular set of crashes are representative of all crashes of that type. This is a typical 
problem facing in-depth investigation projects, where available resources usually only 
admit investigation of a limited crash set. In Section 3, the two current main approaches 
and their drawbacks are discussed, and in Paper II, a methodology intended to 
overcome those drawbacks is presented and empirically tested. 
 
The case selection problem relates to the fact that in some countries, e.g. Sweden and 
Norway, there exists a data set that theoretically makes it possible to bypass the 
generalization problem, because the authorities commission in-depth investigations of 
all fatal crashes that occur. These countries thus have access to crash datasets which are 
both representative and detailed, and if they contain relevant information for 
understanding why the crashes occur, they would be very useful for defining ADAS 
evaluation scenarios. However, it is unclear whether these crashes are investigated in a 
way that supports extraction of relevant information for defining ADAS evaluation 
scenarios. The case selection problem is further discussed in Section 3, and in Paper III, 
an empirical study of a fatal crash data set is performed to assess whether the results can 
be useful for ADAS scenario definition. .  
 
Steps 4 and 5, method selection and test plan, relate to how an ADAS evaluation is set 
up, both in terms of experimental design and choice of venue. Recent findings in 
naturalistic driving studies indicate that unexpectedness is a key property of real world 
critical events (e.g. Dingus et al, 2006). To properly evaluate an ADAS influence on 
driver behavior, one must therefore either replicate that real world state of genuine 
unexpectedness in the experimental environment, or show that responses from not so 
surprised drivers can be validly extrapolated to real world events. In Section 4, the 
challenges of creating and acquiring robust measurements of driver performance in 
ADAS relevant situations, i.e. surprise events, particularly in light of drivers inherent 
and quite sophisticated capacity to adapt, are discussed, along with the implications for 
method selection and test plan design. In Paper IV, a driving simulator study is 
performed that explores the extent to which critical, unexpected events can be created 
and repeated during FCW evaluation, and what the results imply for future ADAS 
evaluation.  
 
Step 6, test execution, analysis and reporting, as indicated, concerns the analysis and 
reporting of evaluation results. Although old in traffic safety development in general, an 
issue that has recently come to the foreground in relation to ADAS evaluation is how to 
conduct analyses and reporting on ADAS effects when multiple ADAS are used 
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simultaneously. Future production vehicles are likely to be equipped with bundles of 
ADAS rather than a single function. This should preferably be reflected in the design of 
ADAS evaluation studies, which means that one has to find a way of understanding and 
assessing the a single ADAS’s influence on driver behavior when multiple ADAS are 
simultaneously present in the same vehicle. .  
 
In Section 5, the challenges for identifying isolated effects of a particular ADAS when 
multiple ADAS are present in the vehicle are described for the case of FOT based 
ADAS evaluation, particularly in light of recent studies that indicate that an ADAS 
might influence driver behavior outside the particular scenarios where it is actively 
interacting with the driver.  In Paper V, an empirical study of this issue for an ACC and 
FCW bundle deployed in an FOT is performed. 
 
After the problem descriptions and the literature review in Sections 2-5, the specific 
aims of the thesis are stated in Section 6. In Section 7, the thesis papers are summarized, 
and in Section 8, the strengths and weaknesses of the studies are discussed as well as 
more general topics. The thesis concludes with some suggestions for future work.  
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2  Functional specification and expected 
impacts 
 - Understanding driver behavior and ADAS 
influence in critical driving situations  
 
Haddon (1968) stated that scientific progress in general depends on, and is marked by, 
a transition from classifications based on descriptions of appearances to classifications 
based on fundamental processes. On a general level, a set of principles and concepts 
which capture the fundamental processes in a field of science can be called a conceptual 
framework (Hollnagel and Woods 2005). One way to approach the formulation of such 
a framework is to formulate it as a language problem. The development of a powerful 
descriptive language is fundamental to work and progress in any science. This language, 
or conceptual framework, should include a set of concepts or descriptive components 
that give an accessible yet powerful and scientifically valid description of the field of 
science it concerns, and in general fulfill three general criteria (Hollnagel and Woods 
2005): 
 
• It must describe the important functional characteristics of human-machine 
systems. 
• It must be applicable for specific purposes such as design, analysis and evaluation. 
• It must allow a practically unambiguous use within a group of people, i.e. the 
scientists and practitioners who work broadly within the domain. 
 
In passive safety, work rests firmly on what can be called Haddon’s negative energy 
transfer model. Injuries are understood as occurring when “energy is transferred in such 
ways and amounts, and at such rates, that inanimate or animate structures are 
damaged” (Haddon 1973). Following this model, countermeasures should focus on 
blocking and/or redistributing this unwanted energy in time and space so less or none 
of it reaches human beings in harmful doses. Haddon’s energy transfer model is simple, 
clear, and powerful enough to be useful for mechanical engineers, biomechanical 
experts, behavioral scientists and/or laypersons alike, and they can communicate across 
their specialties using this model.  
 
A conceptual framework for understanding crash causation and prevention that is as 
useful for ADAS evaluation as Haddon’s is for passive safety function evaluation is thus 
still lacking. Active safety needs a scientifically correct conceptual framework that 
paints the big picture of how drivers can end up in critical driving situations, and how 
they would interact with ADAS in these situations. The framework should also be 
possible to grasp intuitively for those who work in the domain, but should also be able 
to specify further according to specific needs and purposes. Without such a framework, 
there is a clear risk of confusion and diverging definitions (Scholliers et al. 2007b).   
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To define a conceptual framework for ADAS evaluation, two of the general criteria 
from Hollnagel and Woods (2005) above can be specified more in detail. For the 
second criterion, which says that the framework must be applicable for specific 
purposes such as design, analysis and evaluation, a more specific formulation is that the 
conceptual framework should be applicable for generating testable hypothesis on which 
changes in driver behavior an ADAS is intended to generate in a critical driving 
situation.  
 
Based on this, the first criteria, i.e. describing the important functional characteristics of 
human-machine systems, can also be given a more precise formulation. To support 
formulation of testable hypothesis for ADAS evaluation in critical driving situations, the 
conceptual framework must characterize 1) the nature of the critical situations, i.e. why 
they evolve; and 2) the driving task, in such a way that it becomes possible to 
understand why drivers sometimes fail and other times succeed in resolving these 
critical situations, and thus where ADAS may play a role.   
 
Addressing the first point requires some form of accident modeling, and addressing the 
second point requires some form of driver model that is compatible with the accident 
modeling. Ultimately, the conceptual framework should merge these two into a 
coherent whole. In the next section, various approaches to accident modeling will be 
reviewed. In the section following that, approaches to driver modeling will be reviewed.  
2.1 Accident modeling in relation to road traffic and ADAS 
evaluation 
An accident model is an abstract conceptual representation of the occurrence and 
development of an accident. It describes how and why crashes happen, it defines 
possible causes and interactions, and it provides the basis for an associated 
countermeasure principle. Accident models are often implicit rather than explicit in the 
accident investigators’ minds and guidelines, and therefore important to explicitly 
identify and reflect upon when discussing safety and risk control (Hollnagel 2004; 
Woltjer 2009).  
 
Over the years, many accident models have been developed. On a general level, these 
can be divided into three categories: simple linear (sequential), complex linear 
(epidemiological), and systemic1 (Hollnagel 2004). In simple linear accident models, 
socio-technical systems are described by their physical and organizational structure. 
Focus is on identifying linear cause-effect relationships between independent 
components, and accidents are viewed as the result of a single sequence of clearly !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Note that the concept systemic here refers to the nature of accidents, rather than the 
scope of the system in which the accident takes place. Taking a systemic view is 
sometimes used to indicate that all parts of a system are allowed targets for analysis and 
countermeasure development, as opposed to focusing on a single part or component. 
Here however, systemic implies that accident causation in a complex system is a question 
of unexpected interactions between control processes at their performance limits rather 
than defaulting parts, and these may occur anywhere and everywhere in the system.  
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identifiable component failures occurring in a specific event order, such as in Heinrich’s 
description of an accident as a row of tumbling dominoes (Heinrich 1931).  
 
Complex linear accident models also describe socio-technical systems by their physical 
and organizational structure and focus on identifying linear cause-effect relationships 
between components. However, the complex models look at relationships between 
interdependent components rather than trying to find a single chain of events. 
Accidents occur when certain combinations of latent conditions and active failures 
coincide in time and/or space in a way that overcomes existing defenses or barriers 
(Reason 1990). A classic example of a complex linear model is the so called Swiss 
cheese model (Reason 1997), which suggests that a complex system is analogous to a 
stack of slices of Swiss cheese. Each slice is an imperfect safety barrier in the system. 
While ideally a problem that passes through a hole in one layer will be stopped by the 
next slice because its holes are in different places, in some unpredicted instances the 
holes in multiple slices happen to be aligned, and an adverse event occurs. Another 
example, which relates directly to traffic safety, can be found in Donges (1999). 
 
The third group, systemic accident models, focus on the natural performance variability 
associated with process control. In a systemic view, the purpose of a socio-technical 
system is to work towards relevant goals, such as reaching a destination safely or 
maintaining a continuous factory output. Accidents occur when one or more of the 
control processes used to achieve these goals coincidentally get out of hand, i.e. exceeds 
situation tolerance, and there is insufficient time and/or resources to regain control 
over them. Examples of systemic models are STAMP and FRAM (Hollnagel 2004; 
Woltjer 2009). 
 
In terms of which of these modeling approaches have bearing on ADAS evaluation, one 
place to look for guidance is in-depth studies of crash causation. Looking at the traffic 
accidents analyzed in the FICA project (Ljung et al. 2007) and SafetyNET 
(SAFETYNET, 2008), it seems clear that linear accident modeling has to be ruled out. 
The crashes investigated in these projects were very rarely attributed to a single series of 
clearly identifiable events. Usually, a more complex process that involved multiple, 
interacting contributing factors was found.  
 
As for deciding between complex linear models like Reason’s Swiss cheese model and 
systemic accident models, a number of researchers have recently argued in favor of 
systemic models, at least when the complexity of the system where the accident occurs 
increases beyond a certain level (Amalberti 2001; Dekker 2005; Hollnagel 2004; 
Leveson 2004; Reason et al. 2006; Rochlin 1999). To summarize their basic argument, 
they say that in complex systems, the number of ways in which different factors can be 
combined to create an accident is practically infinite. Instead of identifying such 
combinations, the most promising approach to accident prevention is to try to identify 
reasons for, and means to reduce, process control variability (Hollnagel 2004; 
Rasmussen 1990).  
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While these authors work in many types of process control domains like aviation and 
software engineering, the argument has been explicitly extended to driving as well. 
According to Huang (2005; 2007), modern road traffic has enough of the complex and 
dynamic characteristics of a complex system to make systemic accident modeling the 
best suited approach in accounting for how and why failures occur, and to 
conceptualize countermeasures.  
 
In the systemic view, loss of control is not considered an extraordinary event. It is rather 
a natural performance variability associated with an operator’s degree of control over 
any process, which enables the operator to cope with complexity and uncertainty by 
adapting procedures and tools according to the situation. However, as Brehmer (1990) 
argues, there is an inherent variance in both peoples’ perception and action which set a 
limit to how well they can adapt. It follows that loss of control will occur when natural 
performance variability pushes the level of control outside the tolerance limits of a 
given context. For any sufficiently complex system, accidents are therefore bound to 
occur sooner or later. This is sometimes referred to as Normal Accident Theory 
(Perrow 1984).   
2.2 Driver modeling in relation to systemic accident modeling 
According to Carsten (2007), two broad approaches to driver modeling can be 
distinguished in the literature. The first is descriptive modeling where one tries to 
describe parts of, or the whole, driving task in terms of what the driver has to do. The 
category can be further subdivided into several subcategories, i.e. task models, adaptive 
control models, and production models. Task models typically present the driving task 
as a set of hierarchically ordered subtasks. Examples include Allen et al. (1971) and 
Michon (1985). Adaptive control models describe driving as a process with inputs, 
outputs, and feedback, where driving is viewed as involving a continuous adaptation to 
a changing environment, in a way which promotes goal fulfillment (Engström and 
Hollnagel 2007). Examples include McRuer et al. (1977) and Hollnagel et al. (2003). 
The driving task can also be described as a set of rules, i.e. a production system. Michon 
(1985) e.g. described a formal set of rules for changing gear.  
 
A possible fourth category to complement Carsten is resource theory models. They 
build on the assumption that humans have a finite amount of resources, and predict 
that driving performance degrades when two or more tasks demand the same resources, 
e.g. see Kahneman (1973). The dominant version today is Wickens’ Multiple Resource 
Theory (MRT) see e.g. Wickens (2002; 2008). MRT has been applied particularly by 
researchers who study how drivers cope with multiple tasks over longer periods of time, 
such as in CAMP’s Driver Behavior Metrics Program (Angell et al. 2006). MRT 
substituted general resource theory when substantial research showed more 
interference between structurally similar than structurally dissimilar tasks. In response, 
Wickens proposed that humans have multiple resources and interference will only be 
strong between tasks that claim the same resources.   
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However, descriptive models are generally analytical and lack predictive elements. It is 
therefore hard to conclude, based on descriptive models, how changes in driver 
motivation, capability, or decision making would affect driving performance or 
situational risk (Carsten 2007).  
 
The second major type is motivational modeling, which describes how the driver 
manages risk or task difficulty in terms of utilities and various types of trade-off 
(Carsten 2007). Well known motivational models include Wilde’s risk homeostasis 
model (Wilde 1982) and Näätanen and Summala’s zero risk model (Näätänen and 
Summala, 1976). Other examples include attempts to characterize how drivers adapt, 
or fail to adapt, to road safety measures, based on perceived changes in risk (Adams 
1995; Evans 1991; OECD 1990).  
 
Some researchers have also tried to merge the two approaches. Hatakka et al. (2002) 
e.g. present a four level descriptive hierarchy model where goals for life and skills for 
living constitute the top layer and vehicle maneuvering constitutes the bottom layer. 
However, motivational models, while in theory more susceptible to testing and 
verification then descriptive models, have not in practice really been put to the test 
(Carsten 2007), and perhaps not even fully specified (Ranney 1994).  
 
This might explain why, according to Elvik (2004), none of the theories of driver 
behavior proposed so far, whether motivational or descriptive, have been applied in 
road safety evaluation research or enjoy widespread approval among road safety 
evaluation researchers. The one exception might be MRT, which is used fairly often in 
human factors related research, such as the design of in-vehicle system interfaces.  
 
Two things can be concluded from reviewing the literature so far. First, given that 
systemic accident modeling is the best approach to describe why critical situations 
occur, the conceptual framework needs to frame ADAS evaluation along those lines. In 
other words, if accidents occur due to unfortunate combinations of control variability in 
the processes involved in driving, then driving is best characterized as a form of process 
control, where accidents occur when control is lost. This perspective follows the 
general structure of the adaptive control models.  
 
Furthermore, as Carsten (2007) noted, these control models describe how the multiple 
control processes involved in driving interact with each other but do not account for 
how goal states are selected. To understand why drivers choose the reference values for 
control that they do, the adaptive control perspective needs to be merged with an 
account of driver motivation. As stated by Eysenck (2004):  
 
“Motivation is closely related to the direction behavior takes (which goal or goals are being 
pursued), the intensity of behavior (amount of effort, concentration, etc. invested in behavior) 
and persistence of behavior (the extent to which a goal is pursued until reached)”. 
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In general, two paradigms for describing human motivation exist. One is to define 
motivation as that which makes us strive for need fulfillment. The most well known 
theory in this paradigm is probably Maslow’s hierarchical theory of needs, where the 
bottom level constitutes a need for survival and the top level a need for self-
actualization (Maslow 1954; 1970).  
 
The other paradigm defines motivation as that which drives action when an equilibrium 
is threatened. This view originated with the phenomenon of homeostasis, which is the 
tendency for an individual’s internal environment, such as body heat, to remain fairly 
constant despite external changes. However, the homeostasis concept has been 
extended to cover psychological and social phenomena. For example, while people do 
not get hungry at exactly the same time every day, dinner time may represent a social 
schedule equilibrium and social norms for when dinner should take place, determined 
by work or other schedules, take precedence (Eysenck 2004).  
 
The homeostasis approach is the one which has been most frequently applied in the 
domain of driving. Apart from Wilde’s risk homeostasis theory, one early account is the 
zero risk theory by Näätänen and Summala (1976), which proposes that driver 
behavior is a balancing act between excitatory forces that push the driver to actively 
look for and exploit opportunities for action present in the environment, and inhibitory 
forces which keep the driver from acting on opportunities for action that might have 
regrettable consequences.  
 
Originally, Näätänen and Summala proposed that inhibition is driven by experienced 
subjective risk. More recently, Vaa (2007) developed this idea by incorporating 
Damasio’s (1994) concept of somatic markers. Somatic markers are emotional signals 
that attach positive or negative feelings to opportunities for action and their outcomes, 
based on previous outcomes from acting on them. Vaa argues that adaptive driver 
behavior largely is governed by somatic markers, especially in relation to threatening 
situations.  
 
Following Vaa, Summala (2007) substituted the concept of subjective risk with 
discomfort, and argued that drivers actually strive to maintain a state of zero 
discomfort. Discomfort include feelings of immediate risk or threat, e.g. in a critical 
traffic situation, but can also be related to mobilization of effort to cope with task 
demands (Hockey 1997).  
2.3 Beyond structure and motivation to expectancy and 
prediction - driving as proactive attention selection and 
action 
An important dimension that is generally missing from both descriptive and 
motivational models, but which a long tradition of research has shown to be a key 
parameter of driver behavior, is an account of driver expectancies or prediction. This 
could be considered unfortunate, because expectancy has a large influence on how 
drivers respond in critical evaluation scenarios. For example, in a meta analysis of BRT 
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from 39 different studies, Green (2000) found that BRT for expected events was on the 
magnitude of 0.6-0.75 s, while BRT for completely unexpected events were on the 
magnitude of 1.5 s and above. In other words, whether an event is expected or not 
might more than double the onset time of the driver response, something which clearly 
is important for ADAS design.  
 
Also in a more general perspective, expectancies and prediction play a key role. As lately 
stated by Woods and Hollnagel (2006), but also by many before them,  human action is 
in general oriented toward the future, in anticipation of, or as preparation for, what 
comes next. Driving conforms to this principle, i.e. that driving is proactive and driven 
top-down by current task goals and the driving context is evident in many studies across 
various domains and topics.  
 
Note, however, that top-down control does not necessarily imply conscious control. As 
proposed by Trick and Enns (2009), a framework that can integrate current research 
on driver attention needs at least two dimensions; one that captures the distinction 
between automatic (non-aware) and controlled (aware) processes, and another 
dimension that reflects the origin of the process, i.e. whether the process is learned or a 
consequence of how humans are built (biological hardwiring). Combining these two 
dimensions lead to four possible modes of attention which they call reflex, habit, 
exploration, and deliberation. Habit and reflex represent automatic attention selection, 
i.e. done without conscious awareness; where habit is attention selection based on 
previous experience, i.e. top down driven; and reflex is attention selection based on 
biological hardwiring so to speak, such as braking when an animal jumps out on the 
road.  
 
Examples of studies showing proactive and goal driven behavior in drivers include the 
studies by Cnossen et al. (2000; 2004), who found that drivers give more priority to 
tasks that serve the goals of the driving task itself. Their test participants put more effort 
into extracting navigation information, presented either as auditory information 
interspersed in a radio program or visually by means of a map, than on performing a 
concurrent artificial memory task.  
 
In another study, Shinoda et al. (2001) found that drivers were more likely to notice 
stop signs located at intersections as opposed to signs in the middle of a block. They 
also showed that subjects spent much more time looking for signs at the intersections 
when asked to drive on their own and follow normal traffic rules compared to when 
asked to follow a lead vehicle. Such contextual selection of visual information is 
underscored in two reviews of theories of gaze allocation, (Hayhoe and Rothkopf 2011; 
Tatler et al. 2011), where it is clearly stated that behavioral goals is a critical factor in 
controlling the acquisition of visual information from the world, i.e. attention selection 
is proactive and goal driven.  
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In two studies of car-to-bicycle conflicts and accidents, Räsänen and Summala (1998), 
and Summala et al. (1996), they found that the most common conflict pattern was 
between drivers turning right and cyclists coming from the right on cycle paths at non-
signalized intersections. Their explanation of this somewhat counterintuitive finding (if 
you are turning right, you should be looking right, right?), is that drivers who are about 
to turn right mainly focus their attention on cars coming from the left, since cars 
coming from the right pose no threat in right hand traffic. They therefore fail to see the 
cyclist coming from the right.  
 
Martens and Micah (2007) showed that when test participants were driving the same 
route repeatedly, the participants’ glances towards traffic signs became shorter at the 
same time as recollection of signs encountered along the route improved. Moreover, 
upon the last drive an intersection was changed so drivers had to yield, and this change 
went undetected by all participants although two responded correctly after crossing the 
yield markings. Martens (2011) also showed that the likelihood of detecting sign 
manipulation at the end of a series of repeated drives depends on several factors. 
Detection improved with a larger difference between the original and the changed sign, 
with the new traffic sign not fitting the traffic scene, and when attention was raised with 
an auditory message.  
 
Hulst et al. (1998) found that drivers adopt a hierarchy of adaptive strategies to control 
time pressure in driving. In normal visibility conditions, drivers had a highly 
anticipatory, proactive driving strategy, i.e. they increased time headway at the 
particular times when they expected a lead vehicle to brake. When the possibilities for 
anticipation were reduced by introducing fog, drivers compensated by means of general 
speed reduction and time headway increase. When the latter compensatory strategy 
was made impossible/undesirable, i.e. when drivers were asked to follow a certain time 
schedule in their driving, they instead compensated by increasing their general level of 
alertness, as testified to by faster and more precise responses to unpredictable 
hazardous events.  
2.4 Summary  
The concepts of natural performance variability, adaptive control, discomfort 
avoidance, and proactive attention selection and action are closely related. In principle, 
if Summala’s (2007) discomfort avoidance principle is applied to the dynamic control 
approach, then selection of reference values for control processes involved in driving 
can be viewed as a balancing act between the desire for goal fulfillment and discomfort 
avoidance. If proactive attention selection and action is added to the mix, then a key 
enabler of critical situations would seem to be situations where natural performance 
variability leads to contextually inappropriate attention selection and/or action. 
Consequently, the role of ADAS can be conceptualized as means of keeping such 
natural performance variability within safe limits.  
 
This view seems to be corroborated by findings in recent naturalistic driving studies, 
which indicate that attention failures, in particular visual inattention to the forward 
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roadway, in combination with unexpected external events such as unexpected lead 
vehicle braking) are key mechanisms behind the occurrence of critical events (Dingus 
et al.; 2006; Olson 2009). Although this provides a good starting point for a conceptual 
framework for ADAS evaluation, many details need to be worked out before a proper 
conceptual framework can be said to have been formulated.   
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3  Scenario definition 
 - Using crash data to specify test scenarios 
 
The third step in the PReVAL evaluation framework is specifying relevant test 
scenarios for evaluating the ADAS at hand. A necessary basis for defining such test 
scenarios is a correct and detailed characterization of the sequence of events which 
leads to the collision type to be prevented (Najm et al. 2002). Moreover, it is necessary 
for this characterization to include information on causal factors (Najm et al. 1995). 
 
In passive safety, crash investigations has proven to be a very valuable source of 
information for understanding injury causation mechanisms and prevalence. For active 
safety, it is hoped that crash investigations could take on a similarly important role, i.e. 
that crash investigations for active safety functions would deliver detailed descriptions 
of crash causation mechanisms for the most prevalent crash types that can be used for 
legislation, countermeasure development, public information campaigns, etc. 
(SAFETYNET, 2005b).  
 
To deliver detailed crash causation descriptions from crash data, at least one of two 
particular problems need to be addressed. The first can be called the generalization 
problem and the second the case selection problem. These will be discussed in turn.  
 
3.1 The generalization problem 
The generalization problem is the question of how to determine that findings from a 
particular set of crashes are representative of all crashes of that type. In passive safety, 
this problem has to a large extent been overcome due to a lot of hard work and the laws 
of physics. In very simplified terms, if a vehicle breaks in a certain way in a crash on the 
field, then the laws of physics predict that if a kinematically similar crash occurs, a 
similar vehicle would likely break in the same way, since it would be exposed to a similar 
onset of accelerations and forces. Thus, it is possible to extrapolate from information on 
how one vehicle breaks to how all similar vehicles will break.  
 
For the humans involved in the crash, the mapping is less straightforward than for the 
vehicles, i.e. rather than extrapolating from one crash test dummy to all humans, 
particular dummies that represent certain percentiles of the population, e.g. a 95 
percentile male, or a 50 percentile female, have been developed. Extrapolation to 
humans in general, i.e. to account for the natural, biological variation in the population, 
therefore requires more than one crash test dummy. However, the number of dummies 
needed is still in the single digit range.  
 
For passive safety, the laws of physics thus provides an immensely powerful helping 
mechanism in addition to all the hard work put in when it comes to generalizing from 
individual cases to the whole population. A limited number of crash tests are sufficient 
to make a reasonably certain prediction on a protective function’s impact on the injury 
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population as a whole2. For ADAS evaluation however, a behavioral Newton who lays 
down the laws of driver behavior is yet to come. Until then, ADAS evaluation has to 
approach the issue of generalization somewhat differently. Other ways have to be found 
to show that a safety problem identified in crash data is representative for ordinary 
drivers in the real world.  
 
Using crash information to define a safety problem usually means retrieving and 
analyzing sufficient amounts of data on contexts and causes of failure to describe what 
the safety problem looks like in reality. This description can then be used as a test 
scenario basis for ADAS evaluation. Creating such problem definitions is usually a two-
step process. Data is first collected from relevant sources. Then the collected data is 
aggregated to create one or more representations of the safety problem which captures 
what is considered to be its typical attributes.  
 
To understand what is meant by typical in this context, the distinction between a type 
and its tokens can be used. A type designates a general item, while a token is a particular 
and concrete instance of that item (Wetzel Winter Edition 2007). If a safety problem is 
defined by analyzing the common attributes of a set of crashes, the safety problem 
representation will be a general crash type rather than a crash token i.e. a particular 
crash. Furthermore, if the common properties are defined correctly, the representation 
will not just be a type, but a prototype, i.e. the most typical representation possible for 
that set of crashes (for more on what defines a prototype, see Rosch 1975a; 1975b; 
Rosch and Mervis 1975). 
 
Defining prototype rather than token evaluation scenarios can be considered an 
advantage in ADAS evaluation if one assumes that solutions to a prototype problem 
will be of greater help to drivers than a solution customized to any one token problem. 
For this assumption to hold, prototype safety problems must be defined through an 
etiological, rather than a descriptive, approach (Haddon 1968). Etiology is the science 
or philosophy of causation, or the part of any special science which speculates on the 
causes of its phenomena (The Oxford English Dictionary, 1989). This means that if 
crash prototypes rather than crash tokens are used to define ADAS evaluation 
scenarios, their characterization should preferably be based on an understanding of 
their causation mechanisms rather than on their appearance. 
 
Using an etiological approach should, however, not be confused with a never ending 
search for root causes. What counts as an understanding of the fundamental processes 
may very well be determined by the constraints of project goals and resources available. 
Scenarios can e.g. be characterized at a level of detail which matches the 
countermeasure cost and availability for a certain project, where the best 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2!Obviously,!this!argument!wholly!depends!on!the!test!setup!being!representative!of!real!world!crashes!and!injury!mechanisms,!which!largely!is!a!research!field!in!its!own!right.!
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countermeasure would be the cheapest available solution which solves the largest part 
of the crash problem.  
 
An etiological approach is thus compatible with defining prototype scenarios according 
to practical rather than theoretical limits. E.g. if a road administration determines that 
collisions with oncoming traffic is the prototypical safety problem, they could spend a 
lot of time investigating all causation mechanisms which make drivers leave their lane. 
However, another fundamental understanding of the problem is that for a collision with 
an oncoming vehicle to occur, the driver must be able to enter the oncoming lane. Since 
installing median guard rails addresses that particular problem, and is an available 
means for the road administration, they could settle for deploying median guard rails 
and leave the fundamental understanding of why drivers leave the lane to others. 
3.2 Prototypical causation and the problem of data sources  
Following Haddon’s line of reasoning, an ideal crash typology for active safety should 
divide crashes into types based on distinct and typical causation mechanisms. After 
using this typology to select and sort all crash data available into their groups, the 
typical circumstances under which each type occurs can then be characterized using 
descriptive variables available in the data. The goal of the process would be a set of 
prototypical crash scenarios with sufficient level of detail for active safety function 
development and evaluation.  
 
In order to identify the details of crash types relevant for ADAS evaluation, data from 
crash investigations is often used. Typically, a pre-crash typology is specified where 
each crash type in the typology represents a problem situation occurring before the 
crash. Available crash data is sorted according to the types of the typology, and the 
typical conditions of each crash type is established by identifying its mean and/or 
median values for each variable used to code crash information. These values are then 
compiled and presented as the typical conditions under which evaluation of an ADAS 
addressing that crash type should take place.  
 
When setting out to define the causes and contexts which make a crash scenario 
prototypical, an often used source is official databases containing police reported 
crashes. These databases can be said to contain macroscopic data (OECD 1988) 
because the number of crashes they contain and the way these are sampled usually 
make the databases statistically representative for crashes occurring in a certain region, 
such as a country. Typical values on pre-crash conditions retrieved from a macroscopic 
database will therefore be statistically representative for the crash population in the 
sampled region, which is a very strong support of their typicality. Examples of studies 
using macroscopic data to characterize crash types include NCSA (2003; 2005; 2006; 
2007), SAFETYNET (2005a; 2007a; 2007b), and SIKA (2006a; 2006b). 
 
From an ADAS evaluation perspective, the weakness of police reported crashes is that 
though they can be quite detailed in describing the crash context conditions  i.e. time of 
day, road type, vehicle type, driver age, etc., they usually contain limited information on 
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why crashes happen (Larsen 2004; Sabey 1990). The latter may be due to the fact that 
police normally aim to determine responsibility rather than to describe exactly why the 
crash occurred. Another reason is the tendency of drivers to underreport certain 
factors, such as fatigue (Anund et al. 2004). Pre-crash typologies developed from police 
reported crashes can thus be detailed in context description, but will be limited in 
causation description.  
 
This means that if only police reported crashes are used to define a pre-crash typology, 
important parts on causation mechanism are left unspecified, and the requirement of 
basing the prototypical crash scenario on an understanding of its causation mechanisms 
is difficult to meet. Other data sources must therefore also be used. 
 
This raises two questions. The first is where else to find information on crash 
contributing factors. The second question is how to determine which contributing 
factors should be kept and which should be discarded, i.e. which are typical for a crash 
type.  
 
Neither of these questions are new. Passive safety faced both questions from the start 
many years ago. There, the first question was answered through the initiation and use of 
case studies. Case studies, or microscopic data, are normally distinguished from 
macroscopic data because crashes are viewed and treated as individual cases rather than 
as a group. In-depth case studies deliver very detailed data on contributing factors 
compared to police reported data, and they contain extensive, theoretically anchored 
efforts to understand and describe why crashes occur. According to Larsen (2004) and 
Midtland et al. (1995), qualitative in-depth crash information is the best option for 
identifying interactions between contributory factors, i.e. for defining causation 
mechanisms.  
 
Case studies provided an excellent source of injury mechanism information for passive 
safety. Judging from two recent accidentology projects targeting active safety’s need for 
information on causation mechanisms, case studies seem to be a possible route to take 
for scenario definition in ADAS evaluation as well. In the Swedish project FICA (Ljung 
et al. 2007) and the European project SAFETYNET (SAFETYNET 2005b; 2008; 
Wallén Warner et al. 2008b), new methodologies developed to uncover and code 
combinations of crash contributing factors from an active safety perspective resulted in 
sets of case studies that contain detailed descriptions of each crash’s contributing 
factors. These can provide the information needed to recreate characteristics of 
contributing factors in ADAS evaluation scenarios.  
 
However, when defining a prototypical scenario, one must verify that it indeed 
represents a general pathology rather than being specific to a particular site or set of 
drivers (Fleury and Brenac 2001). Here, case studies fall short. In in-depth case studies, 
the number of cases collected is usually small and the sampling procedure is rarely 
nationally or internationally representative. Which of the causation mechanisms found 
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in case studies to consider prototypical can therefore not be established directly from 
case studies.  
 
One strategy for creating a connection between macroscopic data and crash causation 
mechanisms in case studies, which several researchers have explored, can be called the 
context matching approach, (see e.g. Chovan et al. 1994; General-Motors-Corporation 
1997; Najm et al. 2007; McCarthy et al. 2010; Wisch et al. 2010). Studies following this 
approach first select a crash type from macroscopic data. Then a set of case studies 
which occur in a similar context i.e. same type of road, same weather, etc. is selected 
from microscopic data. The case studies are analyzed to identify their common 
causation mechanisms, and then the researchers infer those mechanisms to be typical of 
the crash type.  
 
However, the context matching approach suffers from an inherent weakness, which is 
that it cannot a priori be concluded that because an individual crash occurs in a context 
similar to that of a general crash type, its causation mechanisms will be representative of 
that crash type. It is possible that the case studies selected by context matching happen 
to represent only a few odd crashes, for which the contributing factors have nothing to 
do with how typical drivers get involved in the crash type.  
 
Another approach is to start from microscopic data, using the prototype scenario 
approach (Fleury and Brenac 2001) applied e.g. in the project TRACE (Naing et al. 
2007; Van Elslande and Fouquet 2007). First, the case studies are grouped based on 
their similarity in terms of both context properties and causal relationships. When the 
grouping is complete, a prototypical scenario is built for each group by identifying its 
main features (Fleury and Brenac 2001).  
 
The prototypical scenario approach suffers a weakness similar to the context matching 
approach. Since microscopic data rarely is representative, it by definition becomes near 
impossible to determine whether a scenario built only from case studies is 
representative. To illustrate, Swedish statistics from police reported crashes identify a 
crash type called single vehicle crash (SIKA 2006a). When analyzing of set of case 
studies that match this macroscopic crash type, four distinct patterns of causation were 
identified (Sandin and Ljung 2007). The first group of crashes was due to a 
combination of temporary driver distraction and fatigue; the second to locally reduced 
friction; the third to a combination of high speed and psychological stress; and the 
fourth to excessive steering following a surprising event. The crashes in all four groups 
match the context variables for the crash type as found in the macroscopic data, and no 
further data is available to determine if any group’s causation pattern is typical for the 
crash type, or if it just represents a few odd drivers that happened to be investigated in 
that particular project.  
3.3 The case selection problem 
The second problem regarding the use of crash data, i.e. the case selection problem, 
concerns the type of crashes selected for in-depth analysis. Crash investigations have 
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traditionally focused on crashes with the most severe outcomes, i.e. crashes with fatal 
and/or severe injury outcomes. E.g. many projects stipulate some form of minimum 
damage criterion that needs to be met in order for a crash to be investigated, which is 
highly logical when the purpose is to develop countermeasures which target injury 
reduction.  
 
Interestingly, in terms of using crash data to develop test scenarios for evaluating active 
safety functions, this has lead to a situation where there for some countries exist 
exceptions to the usual case of microscopic data not being representative. In countries 
like Sweden and Norway, the authorities commission in-depth investigations of all fatal 
crashes that occur. Thus, there exist some in-depth crash datasets which are both 
representative and detailed. Provided that these datasets contain relevant information 
for understanding why these crashes occur, the problem of linking microscopic data to 
macroscopic data addressed above might be unnecessary to solve, at least for countries 
where such datasets exist, and provided that the aim is to prevent crashes with injury 
outcome rather than crashes in general.  
 
Although in-depth studies of fatal crashes clearly can be informative in terms of 
establishing which injuries a driver has sustained through e.g. post-mortem 
examination, it is by definition impossible to interview that driver in order to 
understand why the crash took place to begin with. Thus, even though other witnesses 
such as the driver of an opposing vehicle can be interviewed, and the crash site as such 
may provide a lot of useful information, it is unclear to what extent in-depth studies of 
fatal crashes really do provide a useful source of information for identifying crash 
contributing factors. This problem needs further study.   
3.4 Summary  
In terms of defining test scenarios for ADAS evaluation as required in step 3 of the 
PReVAL process, it is clear that an improved generalization process for linking 
information in case studies to a macroscopic crash type, covering not only context but 
also causation similarity, is needed. Without such a process, it will remain difficult to 
determine which contributing factors, alone or in combination, should form part of an 
evaluation scenario in order to make the evaluation scenario (proto)typical. While 
Fleury and Brenac (2001) have conducted initial work in this area, they also recognize 
that a more systematic examination is required to establish the link between 
prototypical scenarios built from case studies and crash types represented in 
macroscopic data. 
 
As for the use of data from fatal crashes, their potential use as a source for crash 
causation information is yet to be evaluated. On one hand, they form a highly relevant, 
and in some countries fully representative, set of crashes. On the other hand, it is also 
clear that a number of potential caveats exist which the analysis must overcome. 
However, provided that the crash information is available, it seems warranted to 
explore how far it goes in terms of understanding crash causation and setting up ADAS 
test scenarios.  
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4  Method selection and test plan 
- Measuring performance in adaptive drivers 
 
Most road safety measures have to influence human behavior in order to be effective 
(Elvik 2004). Seat belts must be worn in order to protect from injury; headlights must 
be turned on in order to make the car more visible; drivers must stop at red traffic 
signals for these to function as intended; and so on. This also apply to most ADAS. The 
influence can either be explicit, i.e. the function gives a warning and the driver is 
expected to respond accordingly, or implicit, i.e. the vehicle acts on its own, but the 
driver can override it at any time.  
 
A key aspect of ADAS evaluation is therefore correct measurement of driver 
performance, with and without assistance from the ADAS, collected from relevant 
driving events (Kiefer et al. 1999; Ljung Aust and Engström 2011; Najm et al. 2000).  
 
This leads to a basic methodological challenge in active safety function evaluation 
which is the driver’s adaptive capacity, as described above. In ADAS evaluation, 
successful measurement of driver performance depends on the evaluators’ ability to 
create test scenarios which 1) are sufficiently similar to the real world pre-crash 
scenarios that they are intended to represent, yet 2) lead to a sufficiently measurable 
degree of driver response which can be used to identify performance changes driven by 
the presence of an ADAS.  
 
As reviewed above, driving is largely a self-paced task where drivers actively control 
their own vehicle based on how they expect the traffic situation to develop in the near 
future. If the driver anticipates that the traffic situation somehow might turn critical, 
s/he will normally adapt to avoid this by slowing down, increasing headway and/or pay 
more attention to, and invest more effort in, the driving task (Hulst et al. 1998). 
 
The power and success of this innate capacity to adapt is testified to by the rarity of 
accidents in terms of frequency of occurrence over total driving time. In Swedish data 
on police reported crashes for 2007 found in STRADA (2007, the latest year for which 
final data has been released), there were 21 838 drivers involved passenger car crashes, 
while passenger cars travelled a total of ~64 billion km (SIKA 2007) This translates into 
approx. 3 million km driven per driver involved in a police reported crash. In addition, 
the statistics show that the average yearly mileage for passenger cars is roughly 13 000 
km. Thus, one needs to drive, on average 223 years, to end up in a police reported 
crash.  
 
It is thus clear that drivers have a powerful adaptive capacity. Moreover, they will not 
leave this capacity behind when entering the laboratory. On the contrary, since test 
participants normally have to fulfill some minimum driving experience criteria, they 
bring lots of experience in predicting and resolving potentially critical traffic situations 
with them into the laboratory. This is testified to by numerous studies, which have 
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found e.g. that drivers reduce speed and/or increase headway if there is a lead vehicle 
present when they are doing a secondary task (Antin et al. 1990; Jamson and Merat 
2005; Engström et al. 2005). Furthermore, Rauch et al. (2008) showed that drivers slow 
down before engaging in a secondary task and/or before they expect the driving 
situation to become demanding.  
 
Note that a proper definition of adaptivity really needs to refer to some type of time 
frame. When evaluating ADAS in a laboratory setting which is the focus here, that time 
frame is usually limited, i.e. participants come to the laboratory for a few hours at the 
most, and adaptivity in this setting is thought of as very quick alterations of behavior 
within the ongoing study. Another common way of studying behavioral driver 
adaptation is to look at how drivers respond to general countermeasure 
implementations, such as laws on the use of studded tires (Elvik 1998); the 
introduction of airbags (Sagberg et al. 1997); the presence of road lighting (Assum et 
al.1999); or bans of cell phone use (Nikolaev et al. 2010). In these studies, the time 
frame of the study is often quite long, since e.g. reliable numbers on accident frequency 
takes months rather than hours to accumulate. This might be the reason why the 
adaptation itself seems more or less implicitly assumed to occur over a longer period of 
time as well. This certainly is a possibility, though as far as the author is aware, the 
individual time frame within which people change their behavior as a function of 
putting on studded tires or driving on a lit rather than dark road is neither known nor 
well studied. For the present discussion, this aspect of adaptive behavior will be left 
aside, although it certainly constitutes an important field of research in its own right.  
 
Coming back to ADAS evaluation, in order to assess the influence of an ADAS, one 
must often place the driver in a situation that is rarely encountered and which the driver 
normally would do his/her best to avoid. It follows that the test scenarios have to be 
carefully crafted in order not to provide test drivers with clues that could initiate 
premature adaptation, while still maintaining all relevant properties of the targeted real 
world critical event. Conversely, if the evaluation scenario fails to generate a driver 
adaptation failure similar to those found in the real world pre-crash situations which the 
ADAS is intended for, the validity of the evaluation results is questionable.  
 
If e.g. drivers in a driving simulator study assessing the influence of FCW on BRT 
expect that the lead vehicle will be braking, the BRT measures will not be representative 
of BRTs for truly unexpected and urgent situations where drivers panic brake to avoid 
crashing. As discussed above, Green (2000) clearly showed that BRT depend heavily 
on the level of expectancy in the driver. Hence, drivers should respond faster and faster 
as events repeat if expectancy increase with exposure. This was also shown empirically 
by among others Lee et al. (2002). To properly replicate this real life scenario in an 
experimental setting where FCW is to be evaluated, each critical event should thus 
ideally come as a complete surprise to the driver, since that type of event occur very 
unexpectedly from the driver’s point of view (Dingus et al. 2006). How to replicate 
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such scenarios, and perhaps even more importantly, how to know that one has achieved 
a successful replication, is a topic that merits further study. 
 
Furthermore, even if the first trial scenario is successful in surprising the driver, the 
question is whether the surprise effect can be repeated with the same driver. In 
experimental studies where a group of individuals’ responses to different conditions are 
to be tested, the most economical design, i.e. with the most statistical power in relation 
to how many test subjects are required, is a within group design where the same 
persons experience different conditions in some counterbalanced order (Field, 2009). 
This approach has been repeatedly used in ADAS evaluation.  
 
A common setup in e.g. FCW studies is to repeatedly expose subjects to critical events, 
and then use each driver’s average response when comparing the performance of 
drivers with and without FCW (Abe and Richardson 2004; 2005; 2006a; 2006b; 
Cheng et al. 2002; Jamson et al. 2008; Kramer et al. 2007; Scott and Gray 2008)., 
Provided that driver behavior is inherently adaptive, the question arises of whether a 
within group experimental design is at all suitable for ADAS evaluation. Even if 
measures like random event timing and catch trials are put in place to mask event 
reoccurrence, it is hard to avoid an increased expectancy and response readiness in the 
test subjects.  
4.1 Summary 
Regarding the method selection and test plan design in steps 4 and 5 of the PReVAL 
flowchart, it is clear that given the recent findings which indicate that unexpectedness is 
a key property of real world critical events, the possibilities of creating genuinely 
unexpected events in a controlled experimental setting is key to successful ADAS 
evaluation. To what extent it is possible and not the least verifiable needs further study. 
Furthermore, the use of experimental designs that involve repeated measures need 
careful consideration. In particular, the possibilities of repeating critical events without 
compromising result generalizability must be studied further.   
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5  Test execution, analysis and reporting  
- Interpreting results when evaluating multiple 
ADAS at the same time in the same vehicle 
 
Recently, an alternative approach to laboratory testing of ADAS, e.g. test tracks and 
driving simulators, has been tried out. This approach is called Field Operational Tests 
(FOT) (FESTA-Consortium 2008). In a FOT, data is collected from a large number of 
ADAS-equipped vehicles driven in naturalistic conditions over an extended period of 
time. Large-scale FOTs have been conducted in the US and Japan on a variety of active 
safety systems (see e.g. Ervin et al. 2005; LeBlanc et al. 2006b; Sayer et al. 2011), and 
similar initiatives are underway in Europe, e.g. the EU project euroFOT (euroFOT 
2009), and the Swedish-US collaboration project SeMiFOT (SeMiFOT 2009).  
 
Conducting a FOT to evaluate an ADAS impacts on driver behavior solves many of the 
problems related to trying to actively place adaptive drivers in undesired critical 
situations. Since the drivers’ experiences during the study arguably are consistent with 
events in the real world, critical events that occur during the study have very high 
ecological validity (FESTA-Consortium 2008).  
 
However, with the deployment of recent FOTs like euroFOT, IVBSS, and SeMiFOT, 
another methodological concern has emerged; the issue of how to estimate the 
influence on driver behavior of one ADAS when multiple other ADAS are also present 
in the vehicle (Ljung Aust et al. 2011). In FOTs, hypotheses on ADAS influence are 
usually formulated on a per function basis, i.e. researchers assume that it is possible to 
determine the individual safety impact of any given function.  
 
Depending on the project, this assumption comes from one of two possible underlying 
reasons. One is the experimental setup. If they have equipped the FOT vehicles with 
only one ADAS, it is quite certain that it is the impact of that function alone that is 
being tested. The second reason is what can be called the local influence conjecture. 
Though rarely explicitly formulated in the research plans, it is assumed that the 
influence of an ADAS is limited to the particular times and situations when it is active 
and interacting with the driver. In other words, drivers will respond locally to an ADAS, 
but not show signs of adaptation or behavioral change outside those interactions. If this 
conjecture is accurate, then a research vehicle can be equipped with multiple ADAS, 
and as long as their interaction with the driver does not overlap in time, each function’s 
individual influence can be evaluated.  
 
However, the standalone ADAS experimental design will most likely not be valid in the 
future since modern production vehicles are to an increasing degree being equipped 
with multiple ADAS functions (Faber et al. submitted). Since different ADAS can use 
the same sensor once the sensor is in place, the cost attached to developing additional 
ADAS is limited. Radar e.g. is needed for FCW, there is limited extra cost attached to 
developing and offering ACC or other functions that require lead vehicle monitoring.  
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The local influence conjecture is challenged. In two driving simulator studies, drivers 
were first visually distracted and then exposed to a surprise lead vehicle braking event in 
which they received a FCW (Ljung et al. 2007). Results showed that drivers who had 
received LDW warnings in the vehicle prior to the surprise FCW event responded well 
to the FCW, while the drivers who did not experience vehicle warnings before only 
responded partially to the FCW. Previous interaction with LDW thus improved driver 
responses to FCW, presumably because those drivers had learned to look back to the 
forward roadway and be prepared to respond in the case of a warning. Although this 
effect might be inflated due to the limited driving time, i.e. total driving time was 
approx. 20 minutes so the LDW interaction was in the very recent past for the drivers 
who did well with FCW, it still opens up the general possibility that ADAS influence is 
non-local.  
  
This presents a scientific challenge for ADAS evaluation. In the case of an FOT where 
vehicles are equipped with an ACC and FCW bundle, both FCW and ACC may 
influence longitudinal control of the vehicle. Now, provided that ADAS influence 
potentially is non-local, and assuming that the frequency of critical lead vehicle braking 
events goes down in the treatment phase, the question is which ADAS to credit with 
this improvement. 
 
Unfortunately, the available advice on how to deal with this problem is limited. Even 
though road safety programs consisting of a large number of road safety measures have 
been developed in many countries, empirical studies dealing with combined safety 
systems effects are scarce, and ideas on how to approach this problem are limited (Elvik 
2009; Siegrist 2010). In terms of multiple ADAS assessment, the only explicit proposal 
which the author is aware of comes from Gordon et al. (2010). They propose a model 
which suggests that if there is enough information to do a detailed sequential, analytical 
breakdown of the typical flow of events leading up to a particular crash type, it is 
possible to tell the relative impact of two or more ADAS apart by analyzing which 
contributing factors in the flowchart each ADAS is targeting and assessing their relative 
success in this endeavor. However, the model was not empirically verified in that study.  
 
Elvik (2009) suggests four general conceptual models for calculating combined effects 
of traffic safety measures. The additive effects model assumes that safety effects are 
independent and simply can be added. The dominated effects model assumes that the 
most efficient countermeasure will dominate all others. Last, the independent effects 
model and the correlated effects model both assume that the effectiveness of measure B 
only can be applied to the set of crashes that is left after measure A is introduced; a 
principle which assures that the combined effect never can exceed 100 %. The 
difference between the two latter is that the correlated effects model also assumes that 
introducing B in the traffic system partially weakens the effect of A. A’s effectiveness is 
thus lower in combination with B than standalone.  
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In Elvik’s study, the available data which mainly comes from studies of junction 
improvements, fit both the independent and the correlated effects models and could 
not distinguish between the two. However, Elvik argued in favor of the more 
conservative correlated effects model, based on the fact that risk factors tend to be 
correlated rather than orthogonal, e.g. drivers who are likely to drink and drive are also 
less likely to wear a seatbelt (Nilsson 2004). Andersson (1998) and Gordon et al. 
(2010) seem more oriented towards the independent effects perspective. Siegrist 
(2010) ends up somewhere in between Elvik and Gordon, i.e. he argues for a correlated 
effects model based on the overlapping properties of various countermeasures, but also 
allows the effect reduction due to countermeasure overlap to be offset by positive 
synergy effects, e.g. deployment of multiple countermeasures lead to a general increase 
in public awareness about the problem. 
 
5.1 Summary 
The multiple ADAS issue clearly present a challenge in conducting step 6 of the 
PReVAL process, i.e. test execution, analysis and reporting. Since both theories and 
empirical data on how to address this problem are limited, in particular for bundled 
ADAS; an initial step would seem to be to empirically test whether data from an FOT 
that evaluates a bundled ADAS supports either the explicitly ADAS oriented 
independent effects model from Gordon et al. (2010), or any of the other general 
conceptual models proposed by Elvik (2009).  
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6  Aims 
The general aim of the present thesis is to improve key steps in the procedure for 
functional, formative evaluation of ADAS. This general aim can be broken down into 
the following five particular aims:  
 
• To develop a general conceptual framework for ADAS evaluation that can be used 
for formulating relevant functional descriptions and generating testable hypothesis on 
ADAS influence in critical driving scenarios 
 
• To define a methodology for linking information on crash causation found in case 
studies to crash types defined using macroscopic data 
 
• To assess whether in-depth studies of fatal crashes yield crash causation information 
that is relevant for setting up ADAS evaluation requirements 
 
• To study whether critical driving events that result in realistic driver responses can be 
created and repeated in laboratory based ADAS evaluation  
 
• To empirically test whether existing conceptual models for assessing the combined 
effect of multiple safety functions are applicable to FOT data collected from bundled 
ADAS functions 
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7  Paper summaries 
7.1 Summary of Paper I  
 
A conceptual framework for requirement specification and evaluation of active 
safety functions 
 
Introduction 
To verify that active safety functions have the intended effect on driver performance 
and ultimately reduce the number of crashes, adequate evaluation methods are needed. 
A prerequisite for such evaluation is a conceptual framework, i.e. a set of concepts and 
principles which give an accessible yet powerful and scientifically valid description of 
the research field in which the evaluation takes place. For ADAS evaluation, such a 
framework is lacking.  
 
Method 
A general conceptual framework containing concepts and principles suitable for ADAS 
evaluation was described. The framework is intended to be applicable to the whole 
evaluation process, including the “translation” of accident data into generally applicable 
evaluation scenarios, definition of evaluation hypotheses, and selection of performance 
metrics and criteria. The framework is also meant to be generic, so while it mainly is 
intended for use in the context of controlled experiments in driving simulators and test 
tracks, it should also be applicable in other evaluation environments, such as large-scale 
FOTs. The framework’s applicability to ADAS evaluation was then tested by applying it 
in the context of writing and implementing requirement specifications for ADAS 
evaluation.  
 
Results 
A general conceptual framework containing concepts and principles suitable for ADAS 
evaluation could be described. The framework is called Situational Control, and 
describes driving as a control process motivated by a desire to avoid discomfort. The 
test of its applicability to ADAS evaluation illustrated that the framework can be used to 
define the necessary steps in writing and implementing requirement specifications for 
ADAS evaluation. 
 
Discussion 
While many details remain to work out, the Situational Control framework shows initial 
promise for work related to creating a conceptual framework that can fulfill a similar 
role for active safety function evaluation as Haddon’s energy transfer model does for 
passive safety function evaluation.   
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7.2 Summary of Paper II  
 
Generalization of case studies in road traffic when defining pre-crash scenarios 
for ADAS evaluation 
 
Introduction 
To define pre-crash scenarios for evaluation of active safety functions, data from crash 
investigations is often used. Typical sources of crash data are official databases 
containing police reported crashes and in-depth case studies. The official databases can 
often be considered representative, but they contain little detail on causation. The 
opposite it true of in-depth case studies, i.e. they have much detail on causation but are 
rarely representative. Since pre-crash scenarios for evaluation of active safety functions 
need to be both representative, as well as contain detailed information on causal factors, 
combining data from the two sources when defining pre-crash scenarios would be ideal. 
However, a general difficulty in such work is how to establish that causation 
information identified in a set of case studies actually is representative of a crash type 
identified in an official database.  
 
Method 
In this study, a new methodology for linking causation information in case studies to a 
crash type selected from official databases is proposed and tested. The new 
methodology, called integrated context and cause matching, uses an intermediate layer 
of representatively sampled crash information to evaluate whether the causation 
information identified in a set of case studies is representative of a selected crash type. 
The intermediate layer, which in this study is based on questionnaire responses from 
crash involved drivers, thus act as glue, or a bridge, between the case studies and the 
crash type.  
 
Results 
The study shows that it is possible to create such an intermediate layer, and then 
compare it to the case studies on causation patterns and the selected crash type on 
context properties. The comparisons showed similar patterns of crash contributing 
factors in the case studies and crash questionnaire responses, as well as a high level of 
context similarity between questionnaire responses and the macroscopic crash type.  
 
Discussion 
The results indicate that the information on crash causation present in the selected case 
studies are representative of the crash type. They also indicate that while some 
methodological issues remain to be addressed, the proposed methodology shows good 
promise for work related to defining pre-crash scenarios for ADAS evaluation. 
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7.3 Summary of Paper III 
Fatal intersection crashes in Norway: patterns in contributing factors and data 
collection challenge 
 
Introduction 
Fatal motor vehicle intersection crashes occurring in Norway during the years 2005-
2007 were analyzed to identify causation patterns among their underlying contributing 
factors, and also to assess if the data collection and documentation procedures used by 
the Norwegian in-depth investigation teams produce the information necessary to 
conduct causation pattern analysis.  
 
Method 
28 fatal accidents were analyzed. Causation charts of contributing factors were first 
coded for each driver in each crash using the Driving Reliability and Error Analysis 
Method (DREAM). The charts were then aggregated based on a combination of 
conflict types and whether the driver was going straight or turning. 
 
Results 
Analysis results indicate that drivers who were performing a turning maneuver in these 
crashes faced perception difficulties and unexpected behavior from the primary conflict 
vehicle, while at the same time trying to negotiate a demanding traffic situation. Drivers 
who were going straight, on the other hand, had less perception difficulties but largely 
expect any turning drivers to yield, which led to either slow reaction, or no reaction at 
all.  
 
Discussion 
In terms of common contributing factors, those often pointed to in literature as 
contributing to fatal crashes, e.g. high speed, drugs and/or alcohol, and inadequate 
driver training, contributed in 12 of 28 accidents. This confirms their prevalence, but 
also shows that most drivers end up in these situations due to combinations of less 
auspicious contributing factors. In terms of data collection and documentation, there 
was an asymmetry in terms of reported obstructions to view due to signposts and 
vegetation. These were frequently reported as contributing for turning drivers, but 
rarely reported as contributing for their counterparts in the same crashes. This probably 
reflects an involuntary focus of the analyst on identifying contributing factors for the 
driver held legally liable, while less attention is paid to the driver judged not at fault. 
Since liability often is irrelevant from a countermeasure development point of view, this 
underlying investigator approach needs to be addressed to avoid future bias in crash 
investigation reports. 
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7.4 Summary of Paper IV 
Effects of forward collision warning and repeated event exposure on emergency 
braking  
 
Introduction 
Many experimental studies use repeated lead vehicle braking events to study the effects 
of FCW systems. It can, however, be argued that the use of repeated events induce 
expectancies and anticipatory behavior that may undermine validity in terms of 
generalizability to real-world, naturalistic, emergency braking events. The main 
objective of the present study was to examine to what extent the effect of FCW on 
response performance is moderated by repeated exposure to a critical lead vehicle 
braking event. A further objective was to examine if these effects depended on scenario 
criticality, here defined as the available time headway when the lead vehicle starts to 
brake.  
 
Method 
A critical lead vehicle braking event was implemented in a moving-base simulator. The 
effects of FCW, repeated event exposure, and initial time headway on driver response 
times and safety margins were examined.  
 
Results 
The results showed that the effect of FCW depended strongly on both repeated 
exposure and initial time headway. In particular, no effects of FCW were found for the 
first exposure while strong effects occurred when the scenario was repeated. This was 
interpreted in terms of a switch from closed-loop responses triggered reactively by the 
situation, towards an open-loop strategy where subjects responded proactively directly 
to the warning. It was also found that initial time headway strongly determined 
response times in closed-loop conditions but not in open-loop conditions. 
 
Discussion 
While these results do not necessarily imply a lack of effect of FCW in real world 
situations, they raise a number of methodological issues pertaining to the design of 
experimental studies with the aim of evaluating the effects of active safety systems. In 
particular, scenario exposure and criticality must be carefully considered when 
designing studies intended to assess the effects of active safety systems and interpreting 
their results.  
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7.5 Summary of Paper V  
How to estimate the combined safety effect of multiple advanced driver assistance 
systems deployed in the same vehicle during field operational tests 
 
Introduction 
The FOT has emerged as an important research methodology for assessing the impact 
of ADAS on driver behavior and traffic safety. Usually, hypothesis formulation and 
testing in FOTs is based on the assumption that ADAS effects can be tested in isolation, 
either because the vehicles are equipped with only one ADAS or because researchers 
assume that the influence of each ADAS is limited to the local time and place where it 
interacts with the driver. However, future vehicles are likely to be equipped with ADAS 
bundles rather than standalone systems. Furthermore, recent research indicates that 
drivers’ response to one ADAS can depend on whether other ADAS are present in the 
vehicle. Models suitable for estimating combined effects of bundled systems are 
therefore needed. The aim of this study was to empirically test whether data from a 
FOT that deploys vehicles with ADAS bundles conform to any in a set of currently 
proposed models, or whether something else is needed. 
 
Method 
Data from the Swedish test center in euroFOT was used. At this center, 102 vehicles 
equipped with an ADAS bundle that includes FCW and ACC were deployed for 
approx. a year per vehicle. Data preparation is not completely finished, but the existing 
dataset, three months of baseline and three months of treatment, was mined for critical 
lead vehicle braking events. For these events, BRT and minimum TTC values were 
calculated. Exposure in terms of km driven per critical event was also calculated. 
Comparisons were then made between baseline and treatment, with data also separated 
based on whether the vehicle was actively exercising some form of longitudinal control, 
i.e. whether cruise control (for baseline) or adaptive cruise control (for treatment) were 
engaged. 
 
Results 
Results indicate that neither the Gordon et al. (2010) model nor the other general 
models in Elvik (2009) fit the data well. Furthermore, for FCW, results violated the 
assumption of only local influence, i.e. FCW effected driver behavior outside the 
particular traffic situations it is designed to address. Lastly, the frequency of critical 
events per km driven was significantly different when regular or adaptive cruise control 
was in use, i.e. when driving was partially automated, compared to when it was not.  
 
Discussion 
Existing models for assessing the combined influence of multiple ADAS in a single 
vehicle seem to be too simplistic. Instead, some form of multidimensional model that is 
built around drivers’ behavioral adaptations to ADAS influence seems necessary to 
develop. 
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8  Discussion 
As stated in the introduction, from both a theoretical and empirical perspective a lot of 
work remains before the procedure for ADAS evaluation reaches the same level of 
detail and standardization as those used for evaluation of in-vehicle injury protection 
functions. Views on what constitutes relevant theory; what is relevant treatment of 
empirical data; how drivers should be prepared before a study; and how the study itself 
should be designed have yet to converge on common definitions. Discussing these 
theoretical and empirical problems and pursuing solutions to them is therefore a key 
issue for improving the for ADAS evaluation procedure.  
 
The general goal of the present thesis was to improve on the six steps defined in the 
PReVAL procedure for functional, formative ADAS evaluation. The extent to which 
this goal has been met will be discussed below. After that, some general remarks and 
suggestions for future work will be presented.  
8.1 Improving steps 1 and 2 – developing a conceptual 
framework that facilitates formulation of functional 
specification and expected impacts 
The first aim of the thesis was to develop a general conceptual framework for ADAS 
evaluation that can be used for formulating relevant functional descriptions and 
generating testable hypothesis on ADAS influence in critical driving scenarios. In 
relation to other conceptual frameworks related to traffic safety in general and ADAS in 
particular, Situational Control indeed seems to fill a gap, i.e. there does not seem to 
exist any other framework that explicitly addresses ADAS evaluation in specific test 
scenarios. Conceptual frameworks in traffic safety seem more oriented toward more 
general issues, such as general views on the driver’s role and responsibilities in the 
traffic system (Larsson et al. 2010); how to efficiently support prioritization between 
different countermeasures (Runyan and Yonas 2008); or how to do quantitative 
modeling of driver behavior that can potentially be used for ADAS assessment 
(Cacciabue and Carsten 2010).  
 
Another way of assessing whether the Situational Control Framework presented in 
Paper I fulfills this aim is to check if it meets the three criteria for conceptual 
frameworks specified in Section 2. The first criterion was that the framework should 
capture the characteristics of what driving is, as well as the reasons for why it may fail, 
by describing the three components cognition, motivation and failure in suitable ways. 
The Situational Control framework does explicitly account for all these components.  
 
The second criterion was that the framework should be applicable to the specific 
purpose of generating testable hypotheses on the changes a proposed ADAS may create 
in a problematic driving situation. The analysis in Paper I indicates that the Situational 
Control framework is well suited for this purpose. By characterizing function influence 
as changes in relevant DVE parameters in relation to a safety zone boundary, 
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hypotheses on function influence are easy to formulate, and also to give a quantitative 
form. The latter is very important, since it provides the basis for evaluation based on 
objective rather than subjective assessment.  
 
The third criteria states that the conceptual framework must allow a practically 
unambiguous use within a group of people, i.e. the scientists and practitioners who 
work broadly within the domain. Whether Situational Control fulfills this criteria is less 
easy to determine. The most pragmatic measure of success is probably the extent to 
which the framework actually is put to use among those who work in the domain. 
Obviously, only time can tell, but at least initially the prospects look quite good. 
Judging by recent work in the project INTERACTIVE (Bakri et al. 2011), the 
framework has been successfully used to formulate the problems and answers the 
projects and studies set out to define and obtain.   
  
It should be recognized that the Situational Control framework does not address  
potential issues with drivers’ basic motor capabilities. This aspect might need 
incorporation in the future. Older drivers e.g. are quite aware of their somewhat slower 
response times, and this may influence the way they select target DVE values, i.e. choice 
of speed, route, etc. However, one way of describing such adaptive behavior is that it 
constitutes a change in the comfort or safety zone boundaries of that particular 
population. Such effects can therefore most likely be incorporated without having to 
change the basics of the framework itself.  
8.2 Improving step 3:I - Stronger links between causation 
information in a case studies and general crash types 
The integrated cause and context matching principle proposed in Paper II seems to be a 
promising way forward when it comes to linking in-depth case study information to 
general crash types. It overcomes the limitations inherent to the context matching 
principle and the prototypical scenario approaches by offering a way of generalization 
from a limited crash set that is based not only on context but on causation information 
as well. This is clearly an improvement compared to existing approaches.  
 
However, the success in applying the methodology clearly depends on researchers 
being able to collect or access relevant questionnaire data in sufficient quantities. There 
also seem to be some very basic limitations to questionnaire data, stemming from its 
self-reported nature and the fact that crash involved drivers rarely are professional road 
or vehicle analysts. The nature of these limitations suggests that they may be difficult to 
overcome solely by improved questionnaire design.  
 
In the end though, the fact that the empirical data in Paper II showed that general 
trends on causation in both in-depth and questionnaire data were similar, and that the 
differences between the macroscopic crash type and the questionnaire dataset were 
explainable without breaking the connection, makes a strong case for continued 
exploration of the methodology.  
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8.3 Improving step 3:II – using in-depth studies of fatal crashes 
to capture causation information  
Fatal crashes form a relevant, and in some countries fully representative, set of in-depth 
investigated crashes. However, the study in Paper III shows that this dataset might not 
be relevant for ADAS evaluation, or at least must be analyzed with caution. Two main 
reasons for this are that driver fatigue and driver distraction did not show up as 
contributing factors in the study, despite being identified as main contributors to loss of 
situational control and thus to traffic accidents in numerous other studies (e.g. Anund 
et al. 2004; Hickman 2010).  
 
There are two ways to explain why these factors do not show up; either the accident 
investigators failed to identify instances where they contributed, or these factors do not 
contribute to fatal crashes. In case of the former, investigators might need more training 
to recognize them. However, it is more likely that they are just hard to capture through 
fatal crash investigations. The information necessary for coding them as contributing 
factors usually comes from driver interviews, which is inherently impossible for at least 
one subject in a fatal crash. Furthermore, the Norwegian in-depth investigation teams 
rarely conduct their own interviews with those involved who can be interviewed; 
instead they use protocols from police conducted interviews. Here it can be 
hypothesized that crash survivors are not always completely forthcoming when 
describing crash circumstances to the police, but also that the police might not be 
asking the type of questions a crash investigator would ask. Thus, if the first explanation 
is right, then fatal crash investigations will always have an inherent omission bias for 
these factors.  
 
On the other hand, if the second explanation holds, then one has to conclude that the 
causation mechanisms underlying loss of situational control in fatal crashes are at least 
partially different from those for crashes with less severe outcomes, and thus what 
separate ADAS for fatal and other crashes might need to be developed and tested. This 
possibility is further supported by the fact that not only distraction and drowsiness, but 
many more of the possible contributing factors available to the crash causation coder in 
DREAM, were never applicable to the data, despite DREAM having been put through 
fairly extensive validation work to corroborate it with other researchers’ findings on 
crash causation (Wallén Warner et al. 2008a).  
 
For the second explanation to hold, however, a prerequisite is that there exists causal 
mappings between pre-crash behavior and post-crash bodily injury which prevent 
distraction, fatigue, as well the other unused factors from contributing to fatal 
outcomes. The only mapping that comes to mind in this case is between distraction and 
speed selection, where the idea would be that as speed, and thus the amount of energy 
to be dissipated in a crash, increases, the influence of distraction on the driver’s 
situational control is reduced. In other words, at high speeds the driver’s full attention is 
required to keep the car on the road, and the driver will therefore not engage in 
secondary tasks. However, while this conjecture might apply to some of the involved 
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drivers, e.g. the motorcycle drivers who were speeding for sheer excitement, a majority 
of the crashes in Paper III took place at normal speeds within the legal limits of the 
traffic system, and thus would need another explanation of why distraction does not 
contribute.   
 
Which of the explanations above that best suits the crash type is a topic for further 
study. However, based on the study in Paper III, in-depth investigations of fatal crashes 
does not seem to be the best source of information for defining ADAS evaluation 
scenarios.  
8.4 Improving steps 4 and 5  - creating and repeating critical 
driving events in driving simulator based ADAS evaluation  
The recent findings in naturalistic driving studies which point out unexpectedness as a 
key property of critical events in the real world (Dingus et al. 2006), together with the 
long tradition of research showing that expectancy heavily influences response times, 
clearly indicate that successful ADAS evaluation depends on the possibility to create 
genuinely unexpected events in a controlled experimental setting.  
 
The study in Paper IV suggests that creating a single unexpected critical event is 
feasible, at least in a driving simulator environment where the laws of physics can be 
manipulated without the test subject realizing it. However, repetition of such critical 
events generate a relatively complex adaptation process, where adaptation also occur at 
different rates for drivers with and without the evaluated ADAS. Similar findings, and 
the problem they pose for ADAS evaluation requirements, have as far as the author is 
aware, not been discussed in the literature, although the implications are quite 
profound. 
 
Firstly, the use of repeated critical events to evaluate ADAS in an experimental setting 
might not be a viable approach towards generalizability. Secondly, the lack of a FCW 
effect on response times in the first event shows the importance of relevant driver 
preparation. To get valid results, ADAS evaluation would benefit from using subjects 
with previous experience of the ADAS in everyday driving. Drivers with such 
experience can be expected to have a well formed association between the warning and 
the intended response, which would increase the likelihood of a more representative 
response in the first and thus genuinely unexpected and critical event. In addition, they 
would be less likely to respond directly to the warning, as they would understand that 
such warnings generally require a situation assessment prior to response. This would 
reduce the likelihood of interaction effects between ADAS and event repetition if the 
critical event was repeated, assuming that these are the product of the altered response 
strategy displayed in this study.  
 
Another experimental design issue highlighted in the study is that the available room 
for ADAS driven improvement is determined by the gap between when a warning is 
given and when looming cues that trigger a braking or steering response become 
critically strong. With the exception of Engström (2010), the author is not aware of this 
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fact being discussed in the literature either. However, it has important implications for 
ADAS evaluation. If e.g. the road authorities in a country decide to develop an FCW 
evaluation scenario that can be used for official approval or rating but which does not 
address this issue, manufacturers might lower their warning thresholds in order to 
trigger the warning early, and thus maximize the measured response time improvement 
provided that at least some drivers respond to warning timing rather than looming cues.  
 
Application of such strategies would have unfortunate consequences for real world 
driving. Framed within the Situational Control framework, if an official test rewards 
sensitive FCW systems that give early warnings and such systems therefore are the ones 
deployed on the market, then many of the warnings in real life will occur while the 
driver is well within his/her comfort zone boundary. These warnings would therefore 
be perceived as nuisance warnings, even though the driver might fully understands why 
they were given, and hence reduce the likelihood that the driver will treat each alarm as 
indicating a potentially critical situation that requires immediate and accurate 
assessment. Early warnings might therefore reduce the likelihood of the function 
leading to an actual reduction in the number of crashes.  
8.5 Improving step 6 – selecting a model for assessing 
combined ADAS effects  
An appropriate analysis of combined ADAS effects requires an empirically validated 
prediction model. As Paper V indicates, this deserves attention in future research, since 
none of the models from the literature review fit the empirical data particularly well.  
 
To fit the data within the modeling paradigm suggested by Elvik (2009), one has to 
formulate a model beyond the suggested end point referred to as the dominant effects 
model. Since critical events occurred more often when both ACC and FCW were active 
compared to the average baseline, but less often when FCW only was active compared 
to the average baseline, an interpretation within the paradigm would state that the 
positive effect of a standalone FCW is not only negated but cancelled with margin when 
bundled with ACC.   
 
Such a model would however probably be inaccurate for several reasons. First, as the 
analysis of other variables in the dataset showed, the circumstances under which drivers 
opt for partially automated control, i.e. use CC or ACC, are different compared to those 
under which drivers use fully manual control. Second, conflict rates could also differ 
due to the way semi-autonomous driving might influence drivers’ attention selection 
and situational control.  
 
This illustrates the importance of careful selection of comparison conditions when 
doing ADAS evaluation. The frequency decrease critical events was 23% when FCW 
only was active, while it was 52% when FCW and ACC were simultaneously active. 
Provided that it is appropriate to separate partially automated driving from fully manual 
driving as done in Paper V, the results can instead be said to indicate that FCW in 
general lessens the frequency of involvement in critical lead vehicle braking events, and 
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that ACC adds even further reduction under partially automated driving conditions, i.e. 
when some form of cruise control is being used.  
  
The study also corroborated the findings in Ljung et al. (2007), i.e. the influence of 
FCW did not follow the local influence conjecture given the accident causation 
mechanism description used. A key assumption underlying the only explicit combined 
effects model available, i.e. the independent effects model from Gordon et al. (2010), 
was thus not supported. Rather than acting as a local response trigger in critical 
situations, it seems like FCW more played the role of a driver habituator that through 
its driver interaction helped improve headway keeping in a manner that lessened lead 
vehicle conflict frequency.  
 
On the limiting side, it should be pointed out that the interpretations above rest on the 
assumption that the selected dataset is relevant for prediction of rear end crash 
involvement. However, none of the critical events identified in this study resulted in an 
actual crash. One could therefore question whether a dataset like the present one 
actually is relevant for making predictions about ADAS effects on crash involvement. 
This is clearly a topic that needs further study.  
8.6 General remarks and suggestions for future work 
It is clear that generally speaking, it is still early days for ADAS evaluation and much 
further development is to be expected. While the work performed in the present thesis 
arguably to some extent has improved on the steps of the PReVAL ADAS evaluation 
process, it is also clear that much more is necessary before ADAS evaluation becomes a 
fully mature and highly standardized domain.  
 
On a general note, it is clear that when approaching ADAS evaluation in a formative 
and functional manner, the natural variability and complexity of some of the evaluated 
components have to be simplified. This holds in particular for the drivers and the traffic 
environment. For example, in Sweden, out of a population of  ~9.5 million (SCB, 
2012), approximately 6.2 million hold a driver’s license. Thus, even if an evaluation of 
an ADAS unique to Sweden was to include 40, 60 or 100 subjects, there is a clear risk 
that the behavior of the selected subjects might not be representative of the 6.2 million. 
The same argument can be made for representations of the traffic environment, e.g. 
intersection layout and design is not uniform throughout Sweden, so a couple of 
generic representations e.g. in a driving simulator would not capture the full variability 
of Swedish intersections.  
 
The extent and severity of these generalization problems in ADAS evaluation are 
largely unknown. One could hypothesize that the variability is very large due to the 
population size, but one could also hypothesize that drivers on average have so many 
hours behind the wheel when they encounter a truly critical situation that their 
responses are highly overlearned and more or less identical. As far as the author is 
aware, no one has yet attempted to calculate how large a driver or road design sample 
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must be in order to capture say 95 percent of the total variability in driver responses to 
critical situations and corresponding ADAS input at those locations.  
 
However, judging by the variability in driver response from the empirical studies in the 
present work, safety margins seem to be a personal thing. For ADAS evaluation, it 
might therefore be the case that the population variability is so large that use of mean 
values for response times, etc., will not be meaningful. As ADAS developers are likely to 
recognize this differentiation and invest efforts into personalizing ADAS properties and 
interfaces, future ADAS evaluation procedures have to take this into account. It carries 
numerous implications for key issues like test subject preparation, individual tailoring 
of test scenarios to test drivers’ own comfort zones, and the like.  
 
Another conclusion that the author would like to draw from the studies is this thesis is 
that the time seems to be right to embrace the fact that driver behavior is inherently 
complex and adaptive in nature. Simple models of driver behavior do not fit empirical 
data well; they are too static representations of what goes on in driving. More complex 
models that come closer to real behavior are necessary, and this is likely to have an 
impact on how testable hypothesis for ADAS evaluation are formulated in the future.  
 
The study in Paper IV pointed out that ADAS evaluation would benefit from using 
subjects with previous experience of the ADAS in everyday driving. The topic of test 
driver preparation in terms of previous ADAS exposure is very interesting to pursue. It 
is an aspect of a more general topic that sometimes is called driver adaptation over time. 
The basic idea is that learning and adjusting behavior based on ADAS input is an 
iterative process, so driver responses will vary over time. Furthermore, it is not clear 
whether drivers reach a stable state over time, or whether responses continue to 
oscillate. From an ADAS development perspective, this means that optimal settings and 
interaction will depend on where in that iterative process the driver is when a truly 
critical event occurs. Finding ways to measure the adaptation process and making sure 
that the test subject used are at a relevant stage of their adaptation is therefore key both 
to ADAS improvement and evaluation, and worthy of further study.  
 
In relation to data collection, it seems clear that each data type has its own limitations. 
Questionnaire data suffers from problems related to self-reporting and the fact that 
crash involved drivers rarely are professional analysts. Data on driver behavior from 
driving simulators comes from time compressed exposure to very particular events in 
an artificial environment. FOT data shows high degrees of variability and low levels of 
exposure to truly critical events. Video data might create a bias toward visible driver 
behaviors, while on scene, in-depth analysis of crashes focus a lot more on what the 
driver was thinking and expecting. Neither of these limitations are new nor surprising, 
but they clearly indicate that the support data for ADAS evaluation cannot come from a 
single source only. A full and deep understanding of the problem and how a suggested 
ADAS will effect it requires combining these data collection methods in an intelligent 
way.  
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It is clear that an important challenge in future ADAS evaluation is the measurement of 
driver performance. In the situational control framework, it is stated that all relevant 
situational control indicators should be measured. This is relatively easy for driving 
performance as indicated through kinematics but much more difficult when it comes to 
measuring how the driver mentally adapts to a development of the situation or the 
input of an ADAS. Operational definitions of e.g. what it means to have seen an object 
such as an oncoming vehicle, and what it means to understand the consequences of its 
presence, have to be developed and tried. However, some caution against making these 
definitions too rigid or final is also advised, since societal learning might make today’s 
strategies obsolete tomorrow. Much as the general population e.g. now relies on 
everyday cell phone use in a way that was inconceivable 15 years ago. The same could 
be hypothesized for ADAS, i.e. as they become commonplace and most drivers get 
them, it will be more acceptable to rely on these systems for safe transport. Thus, the 
variability in terms of what the population expects in terms of warning timing, etc. 
might actually shrink. At the same time, expectations on stability and accuracy may 
increase. Any such trends are important to follow, as they set clear limits and 
requirements for ADAS performance.  
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